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NSC BRIEFING

8 June 1954

## THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SYRIA

### I. The governmental ineffectiveness

#### A. Weak caretaker cabinet

1. Unable set date for promised parliamentary elections.

Last suggested date sometime in August, now also  
uncertain.

2. Frequently reported seriously split, on verge of resigning  
in favor of another interim cabinet.

#### B. Major political parties--Nationalists and Populists--are

pulling apart even though still collaborating in caretaker  
cabinet.

1. Neither party would seem to be able win decisive electoral  
victory.
2. Can't agree on common program and slate of candidates.
3. Even if they did, it would be a fragile coalition.

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II. Possibility of a coup

A. Politicians' failures increase possibility of a leftist--  
military or straight military coup.

1. Chief danger from Akram Hawrani, radical socialist, and  
his military partisans--variously numbered at 300-400  
army officers out of estimated 2,000.

(a) Reportedly vetoed suggested military coup 17 May

because of unfavorable circumstances.  
25X1A6a

(b) [REDACTED] reports he will attempt  
coup before elections.

2. Another threat: straight military coup as result of army  
dissatisfaction over civilian effort to control it.

(a) Assistant Chief of Staff Malki, popular and  
influential officer, considered threat; threatened  
defense minister with "consequences" if "touched" or  
sent out of country. Malki allegedly supporter of  
Hawrani.

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(b) Captain Hamdun, who played major role overthrow

of Shishakli, involved in mid-March abortive coup and

made 17 May suggestion to Hawrani might act on own as

well as with Hawrani.

(c) Armored brigade commander Colonel Assaf frequently

involved in plots.

III. Outlook

A. Immediate possibility of a successful coup cannot be

discounted. However, army leaders appear badly split. We

really know little about various military leaders and their

current ambitions and plans.

B. More likely, the situation will continue deteriorate until <sup>AND THAT</sup>

increased unpopularity of civilian government <sup>NAY</sup> ~~gives reins~~

<sup>INVITE</sup> to extremists and <sup>OR</sup> military <sup>ACTION</sup> 6